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Abstract
This paper discusses the problem of specifying probabilistic models for choices (strategies) with uncertain
outcomes. The most general case we consider is choice settings where the uncertain outcomes are sets
which may contain more than one alternative. This is of interest for the following type of choice processes
that take place in two stages: In stage one the agent has the choice between uncertain sets of
alternatives and only knows the probabilities of which alternative that belongs to each set. Conditional
on the choice in the first stage the content of the chosen set is revealed and the agent chooses (under
perfect certainty) the most preferred one from this set. The standard setting in which the outcomes are
single alternatives, follows as a special case of the model.
The point of departure is a generalization of Luce IIA assumption to choice experiments with uncertain
outcomes and we analyze the implications when IIA is combined with particular assumptions about
invariance with respect to aggregations of strategies.
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1. Introduction
This paper develops a class of probabilistic choice models for choice experiments in
which the outcomes are uncertain to the agent. This means that we assume that the agent's
response to the same choice situation (with uncertain outcomes) is governed by a probability
mechanism, and so in general he exhibits inconsistencies. By now there is a huge literature
on stochastic choice models with certain outcomes. (For a summary of these models, see
Suppes et al., 1989, ch. 17.) In fact, it was empirical observations of inconsistencies, dating
back to Thurstone (1927), that lead to the study of probabilistic theories in the first place.
Thurstone argued that one reason for the observed inconsistencies is that the agent has
difficulties with assessing the precise value (to him) of the choice objects. While probabilistic
models for certain outcomes have been studied and applied extensively in psychology and
economics it seems that there is little interest for developing corresponding models for choice
with uncertain outcomes (cf. Machina, 1985). As far as we know, there are no contributions
in this field since the sixties. This is rather curious since one would expect that if an agent
has problems with rank ordering alternatives with certain outcomes he would certainly fmd
it difficult to choose among gambles. The importance of developing theoretically justified
stochastic choice models in this context has been accentuated in two recent papers, Harless
and Camerer (1994, p. 1287) and Hey and Orme (1994). For example, Hey and Orme, p.p.
1321-1322, argue;
"Our results suggest quite strongly that the truth is not going to be found along this
deterministic choice route, unless some account is taken of the errors. There is clearly a
problem of identifying the underlying "true" model because of these errors — indeed it could
be argued that the lack of significance for some of the top-level functionals (deterministic non-
expected utility functionals) for some of the subjects in our study could simply result from this
noise, ...".
hi the next paragraph they conclude:
'..., we are tempted to conclude by saying that our study indicates that behavior can be
reasonably well modelled (to what might be termed a 'reasonable approximation') as
'Expected utility plus noise'. Perhaps we should now spend some time on thinking about the
noise, rather than about even more alternatives to expected utility?"
, The point of departure in this paper is to utilize some of the ideas that have emerged
in the literature on discrete choice models with certain outcomes to obtain a theoretical
rationale for similar models with uncertain outcomes.
The most general choice setting we have studied can be described as follows: The
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choice process takes place in two stages. In stage one the agent has the choice between a
finite number of strategies. To each strategy is associated a set of alternatives which is
revealed to the agent after a strategy has been selected. Conditional on the choice of strategy
the agent obtains information about which alternatives belongs to his choice set (which may
contain more than one alternative). In the second stage the agent chooses the most preferred
alternative from the revealed choice set.
A typical example is the following: Suppose the agent's decision problem is to choose
among different types of jobs. The feasible jobs are distributed across different regions, but
the agent is uncertain about the locations of the feasible jobs. He can only find out which jobs
are feasible in a particular region by moving to this region. In the first stage the strategies
consist of the set of feasible regions. After a region has been selected the set of feasible jobs
in that particular region will be revealed to the agent and he chooses the most preferred job
from this set.
A second example is the choice of education. Here the student faces a discrete set of
schooling alternatives each of which yields a set of uncertain job opportunities which are
revealed after the chosen type of schooling has been completed. Thus the set of strategies is
the set of feasible schooling alternatives. When the chosen school has been completed the set
of feasible jobs will be revealed from which the agent can choose the most preferred one
(second stage).
A third example is related to tourism. In the first stage the tourist has the choice
between a set of travel destinations and he has only limited information about which sites and
activities that are feasible given that a particular destination has been selected. In the second
stage, i.e., when arriving at the destination, he chooses the preferred activity among the
feasible ones.
The reason why we consider choice settings where the uncertain outcomes are sets that
may contain more than one alternative is that, beyond the obvious interest in itself, it turns
out that this case is useful for generating theoretically justifiable structures.
The usual setting in which the uncertain outcomes contains at most one alternative is
evidently a special case of the general framework developed in this paper. Specifically, in this
case one of the models discussed here is equivalent to the Strict expected utility model
proposed by Becker et al. (1963a) and Luce and Suppes (1965). However, these authors
provide no theoretical justification for their model other than the fact that it contains Luce
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model (for certain outcomes) as a special case. Becker et al. (1963a) and Luce and Suppes
also consider other types of stochastic choice models for uncertain outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we discuss why a standard
approach to modeling the kind of phenomenons mentioned above are likely to be rather
intractable. In Section 3 we introduce an alternative approach. The new approach introduced
here is analogous to Luce's (1959) theory of probabilistic choice. Specifically, we assume that
the agent's choice between sets of strategies is probabilistic and satisfies the assumption
known as "Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives". In Section 4 we demonstrate that the
choice model obtained in Section 3 is compatible with a random utility representation in
which the structural part of the random utilities can be interpreted as an "expected utility"
(relative to the agent). In Section 5 the random utility representation is extended and some
non-parametrically testable properties are obtained. In the final section we demonstrate that
in particular choice settings the choice model developed under assumptions made in Section
3 has the same formal structure as a model for choice under perfect certainty but with choice
sets that are latent to the analyst.
Although models developed in this paper are stochastic versions of the expected utility
model, it is easily realized how these models in some cases could be extended to
corresponding stochastic non-expected utility models. This is the case for the Rank Dependent
Expected Utility Model (cf. Quiggin, 1982, Yaari, 1987, Chew, Kami and Safra, 1987), Allais
(1979), and the Subjective Expected Utility Model, (Edwards, 1962, and Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). What all of these non-expected utility models have in common is that the
conditional probabilities for the respective outcomes given the choice are replaced by a
function of these probabilities.
2. Discussion of a standard modeling approach
Above we emphasised the need for developing stochastic choice theories to
accommodate behavioral inconsistencies. When the outcomes are uncertain sets of alternatives
we shall demonstrate later in this paper that our stochastic modelling approach yields a
framework that is convenient for empirical modeling in contrast to the deterministic expected
utility approach. In this section we shall illustrate that in the context of empirical modelling,
the deterministic expected utility model, when combined with utilities that contain
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unobservable taste-shifters, is likely to produce rather intractable functional forms.
To this end let us consider an agent that has the choice between two sets B s and Bs,.
The agent does not know — ex ante — which alternatives that belong to B s and B s,. Let Uk
be the agent's utility of alternative k. We assume that the utility function has the structure
Uk bk Ek (2.1)
(or alternatively an additive structure), where fed are positive random variables and bk are
positive structural terms. As mentioned above we assume in this section that {El( I are random
only to the analyst. Thus to the agent the taste-shifters are known. Moreover, the agent is
assumed to know the probability distribution of the random choice sets {B s,13 s, }. When the
choice sets (which are revealed in the second stage) are uncertain and the agent behaves
according to the expected utility hypothesis, the agent will prefer s to s' if
E(iirc lEaBX: (13 k ) I {Ek}) > E( 1 ,DEVP k Ek) I {Ek}) • (2.2)
As is clear from the notation in (2.2), expectation is evaluated with respect to the probability
distribution of B s and Be, respectively, conditional on the taste-shifters 1;1. While (2.2)
describes the agent's decision rule, it is not immediately useful for empirical analyses due to
the fact that {El( ) are unobservable. Accordingly, from the analyst's point of view it is
necessary to calculate the choice probability,
P(E(mEaBx(E3 k ek)	 > Etmax(
‘kE B., E )1{Ek}q (2.3)
Let N be the total number of alternatives. When the probability distribution of (e 1 ,e2,...,eN)
has been specified, (2.3) can in principle be calculated. However, by looking at (2.3) we
realize that this will lead to very complicated and intractable mathematical expressions.
Another, and more theoretical problem, is related to the choice of probability distribution of
the unobservables and whether or not the multiplicative specification (2.1) should be replaced
by an additive one, or possibly by a more flexible functional form. To clarify this point, let
uk* loguk = R: E:
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where E3: = logf3 k and E: = log;. In the case with perfectly certain choice sets the utility
functions Uk and Uk* are of course equivalent. However, this is not the case with uncertain
choice sets since the decision rule (2.2) clearly depends on the choice of transform of the
original utility function.
In light of the problems mentioned above we shall therefore abandon the standard
approach and present an alternative approach below.
3. A "constant utility" approach
We mentioned above that in microeconomic theory the tradition is to assume that the
consumer has a utility function that allows him to rank the alternatives in a consistent and
unambiguous manner when faced with identical choice experiments. This approach has been
critisized by psychologists and others (cf. Thurstone, 1927a,b, Luce, 1959; Tversky, 1972) to
mention just a few who argue that when faced with a choice among several alternatives
people often experience uncertainty and inconsistency. That is, they have difficulties with
assessing the precise (subjective) value of the alternatives and consequently the choice
outcomes in identical choice experiments may vary across experiments. To account for this
empirical evidence the psychologists have developed probabilistic choice models. In the
psychological choice literature one has traditionally distinguished between two types of choice
models: In the constant utility model the decision rule is viewed as stochastic while utility is
deterministic (Luce, Tversky). Luce model (Luce, 1959) is the most famous example of a
constant utility model. Luce derives this model from his choice axiom (IIA) and demonstrates
that it implies the existence of a unique (except for a multiplicative constant) scale (constant
— or deterministic utility) from which choice probabilities can be expressed by a simple
formulae. In the random utility model, utility is viewed as stochastic (Thurstone) while the
decision rule is deterministic. In light of recent work by economists it seems that the
difference between these models is only superficial. Specifically, Holman and Marley (cited
in Luce and Suppes, 1965) and McFadden (1981) have demonstrated that the most familiar
constant utility models such as the Luce model and Tversky's "elimination by aspects" can
both be represented by random utility formulations.
The most famous contribution to the literature of probabilistic choice models is the
monograph by Luce (1959). In the present section we shall discuss how his approach can be
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adapted to apply in the particular choice setting that is the concern of this paper. First we
need some additional notation.
Recall that we consider the following choice process that takes place in two stages:
In the first stage the agent has the choice between s=1,2,...,M, strategies. Conditional on the
choice of a particular strategy s a finite set of feasible alternatives B„ is revealed to him.
Before the choice of strategy s the agent does not know which of the alternatives that belong
to B e'. Let S denote the total index set of strategies, i.e., S={ 1,2,...,1■4}, N the total number
of alternatives and 3 the family of subsets {B s, SE S }. For a given set
 BE 3 define the utility
of B s as the utility of the most attractive alternative in
 B.
In general, the alternatives may depend on characteristics that are specific to B.
However, we realize that this case is a special case of the general setup, which is obtained
by letting the probabilities of alternatives that do not belong to B s (say) be equal to zero.
Let P(S 1 ,S2) be the probability that the agent shall choose a strategy from S 1 when the
set of feasible strategies is S2, where S 1cS2cS. We assume that
p(s 1; s2) = E P(S; S2).	 (3.1)
seS,
Assumption Al 
The sets in a are almost surely disjoint.
Assumption A2 
For any S1cS2cS, P(S1 -S2)€(0,1) and
P(s1;š) =13(512;,-S)P(Si;52).	 (3.2)
Although the agent in stage two is no longer uncertain about whether an alternative is feasible or not he may
still be uncertain about the consequences of choosing a particular alternative. In this case the relevant decision
rule in the second stage is to make the choice from B s that maximizes expected utility.
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Assumption A2 is the wellknown "Independence from irrelevant alternatives" (IIA),
assumption which was proposed by Luce (1959).
Theorem 1 
Assumption A2 holds if and only if
a(s)
P(Si; S2)	 SES, 
a(s)
	 (3.3)
seS2
where (a(s)) are positive scalars that are unique apart from a multiplicative constant.
A proof of Theorem 1 is provided by Luce (1959).
Observe that by (3.3) the structure of the choice probabilities is invariant under
aggregation of strategies in the following sense: Let
a(S) E a(s).	 (3.4)
SES
Then (3.3) takes the form
P(S i ,S2) = a(S i)	 a(Si)
a(S2)	 a(S i) +a(S2 -S 1)
(3.5)
From (3.5) we realize that the functional form of the choice probabilities is independent of
S i and S2, which means that the structure of (3.5) is independent of the aggregation level
identified by S 1 and S2.
Derme Ii(B 5)=1 if alternative i belongs to B s and zero otherwise, let
I(B s)=(I 1 (Bs),I2(Bs),...,IN(B s)) and let SI denote the agent's information set. Clearly, the choice
set Bs is completely identified by -1(B5) and when Al holds the probability distribution of
{Bs ) is equivalent to the probability distribution of {I(13 5)}. Let
g(s) s) I = s) =110) (3.6)
for scS. Thus g(s) is the probability that alternative k shall be feasible in the second stage
given S-2 and given that strategy s is chosen in stage one.
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Assumption A3 
The agent knows the probability distribution g(s)=(g 1(s),g2(s),...,gN(s)).
More general, we shall define g(S) as the probability that k becomes feasible given
that some strategy in S, ScS, is chosen. Obviously g(S) =E ga(s).
SES
Assumption A4 
For ScS, the scalar a(S) defined by (3.4) has the structure a(S)=f(S,g(S)) where the
functional
g(S) -->f(S,g(S))
is continuous (with the Euclidian metric).
Assumption A4 is a natural assumption since the agent's "information" about his
opportunities in the first stage, is represented by {g(s)}. In case I i(Bs) and Ii(13 5) are
stochastically independent for i*.j, for all B sE 3, the joint distribution of -1-(13) can be
expressed by g(s). However, if Ii(B s) and Ii(B s) are dependent, this is not the case, so that a
proper representation of the agent's beliefs about his opportunities should include the joint
distribution of I(13 s). Consequently, Assumption A4 is not appropriate when some of the
components ofl(B 5) are dependent.
The crucial property of Assumption A4 is that it is formulated on an aggregate level,
say S. If A4 were assumed to hold only when S contains a single alternative we would obtain
very little from this assumption. This will become clear after going through the arguments in
the proof of the next result.
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Theorem 2 
Suppose that A2, A3 and A4 hold. Then
P (S ; S2) = a(Si)	 Zes, Erv.4 13 rgr(i)
a(S2)	 5-• rv	 ti)
z—leS,	 ro rui
(3.7)
for Sic.S2cS, where Or , r=1,2,...,1V, are scalars that are uniquely determined apart from
multiplication by a constant.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in the appendix.
Let Ni,B s) be the probability of choosing alternative i from B s in the second stage
given that strategy s was chosen in stage one. Recall that in the second stage B, is known and
the outcomes are certain. From (3.7) it follows that the choice probabilities in the second
stage have the form
13) = 	 i
Ere B. r
(3.8)
provided strategy s has been selected in the first stage.
Let Q(i;S) be the probability that alternative i shall be the final outcome. When (3.7)
and (3.8) are combined the next result follows immediately.
Corollary 1 
The probability that alternative i is the choice outcome given that S2 is the set of
feasible strategies, equals
Q(i; 52) = Ts, p (s;s2) ; B5) . 	 (3.9)
In the special case where the choice sets contain only a single element, the model (3.7)
was proposed by Becker et al. (1963a) and Luce and Suppes (1965), p. 360, under the name
Strict expected utility model.
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1 +m
P(m+1,:§) =  1 (3.11)
The next result is due to Becker et al. (1963a).
Corollary 2 
Let a consist of m+1 strategies where
I mgr(n+1)	 s..1 =	 gr(j). (3.10)
for r=1,2,...,N. Then
Proof:
From (3.7) it follows that
p(m+1,-§) 	 prgr(n+i)E	 R
se -g L-drr-.1 11- r gr v-7/
1
E:1 Prgr (M+1)+Mn1 3 rgr(n1+1) M+1
and the proof is complete.
Q.E.D.
Becker et al. (1963b) used the result of Corollary 2 to perform an experiment to test
the prediction (3.11). They found that approximately 18 per cent of the subjects that
participated in the experiment failed to satisfy this model. However, more empirical evidence
is needed to assess the performance of the strict utility model. It is, for example, unlikely that
this model is appropriate for all types of choice experiments.
Recall that the results above do not require a random utility representation. Similarly
to Luce choice model (Luce, 1959), it may be viewed as a revealed preference result. In the
next section we shall show, however, that a particular random utility representation exists that
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is consistent with (3.7) and which can be interpreted as a version of expected utility under
bounded rationality.
4. A random utility representation
The hypothesis of a random utility index as a representation of preferences dates back
to Thurstone (1927). Thurstone conducted psychophysical experiments in which individuals
were asked to compare the intensities of physical stimuli. The interpretation of Thurstone's
theory of random utilities is that while the decision rule is deterministic and follows from
maximizing utility at each moment, the agent's tastes may fluctuate from one moment to the
next in a way that is unpredictable to him. Alternatively, the agent is viewed as being unable
to fix a definite (subjective) value of the alternatives.
We shall now answer the question of whether there exists a utility representation
which implies choice probabilities as in Theorem 2. In settings where the agent knows the
choice sets, Holman and Marley (see Luce and Suppes, 1965, p. 338), McFadden (1974),
Yellott (1977) and Strauss (1979) have analyzed the problem of necessary and sufficient
conditions for random utility models to satisfy IIA.
The choice probabilities that follow from a random utility model are defmed formally
by
P(Si,S) = P (max V s = max Vs)	 (4.1)
seS 1 	seS2
for S 1cS2cS, where {Vs } are random variables. When the joint c.d.f. of (V I ,V2,...,VN) is
specified (4.1) can, at least in principle, be calculated.
Theorem 3 
The random utility model [V) with
vs =Ti sEj3 rgr(s)	 (4.2)
where IL, s=1,2,..., are LW. with
= exky	 (4.3)
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implies that the choice probabilities are given by (3.7).
Proof:
When (4.2) and (4.3) hold the structure (3.7) follows readily by straight forward
calculus.
Q.E.D.
When we take the logarithm of both sides of (4.2) we get an equivalent additive
formulation with random term in: =-- log% that has c.d.f. exp(-0. The additive formulation
is common in discrete choice theory, see e.g. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985).
Let us now compare the utility function of Theorem 3 with what follows from an
analogue to the expected utility hypothesis. Note first that by letting B={10, g(s)=l, it
follows that the corresponding utility reduces to f3k1k where the disturbances {ilk } are i.i.d.
with c.d.f. as in (4.3). Let
max(Okfik)
kek
k€13,
max(0 k
kek
Ek f3 k Ik (B s)= E k
(4.4)
By straightforward calculus it follows that IL is stochastically independent of Bs and has c.d.f.
as in (4.3). From (4.4) we get that
E1max(13 k fl k)	 = TLEk
k
k E(Ik (B s) 1 ij %Elk fig(s), (4.5)
which demonstrates that
E( knr3. 030101%1
has the same c.d.f. as Vs
 given by (4.2). Recall that ri s captures the effect of the unpredictable
taste-shifters. Note that by (4.4) i s
 depends also on B s . Thus we may interpret (4.5) as
follows: According to (4.4) the utility of a strategy s consists of two components, of which
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one, i s, is unpredictable to the agent. The agent does not even know the c.d.f. of { ns }.2 The
best the agent can do is to evaluate expected utility of the structural part,
k Ik (13 .
We may interpret i s as a variable that captures the agent's inability to deal with uncertainty.
Therefore, when identical experiments are repeated the agent may choose different strategies
each time, not only because of randomly fluctuating tastes but also because he is unable to
assess precisely the value of the uncertain sets {B s } .
Another way of expressing this goes as follows: At the moment of choice the agent
ignores the fact that
 i'  on I(B s) because he is unable to account for this dependence.
(Recall that while Tis and I(B s) may be dependent they are, however, stochastically
independent.) When the dependence between I(13s) and fil s } is ignored the term i s only varies
across experiments. At a particular moment in time it is thus treated as a constant by the
agent when he applies the expectation operator.
We conclude this section by showing that the result of Corollary 1 also is consistent
with a random utility representation. This is not obvious due to the fact that the choice
process takes place in two stages and, unless explicitly assumed otherwise, the taste-shifters
will be correlated across stages. However, due to a particular property of the extreme value
distribution the result goes through.
Theorem 4 
Let Uk = Pkik be a random utility model where [NJ are positive scalars and Mk] are
random
 variables with c.d.f.
P (i:45.y) = exp( -y	 (4.6)
Let
vs sEk NO) 	 (4.7)
where
2 Note that the information represented by the c.d.f. given by (4.3) is not relevant here. The c.d.f. (4.3) only
concerns variation in {IL) across identical choice experiments.
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max(fikYlk)
kEB,	 (4.8)
Eic k Ik(Bs)
Then
PIU.=maxUk IVs =maxV , B is revealed  = P(Ui =maxUk =15(1;133).
	
Ic€13	
r.s2
	, 	
T 	 S kEB,	
(4.9)
A proof of Theorem 4 is given in the appendix.
The interpretation of (4.9) is that, conditional on the choice B s in the first stage, the
choice in the second stage only depends on {Ui, i€ B s }.
5. Generalization
We shall now discuss how the model above can be generalized. Recall first that the
model above contains the Luce model for choice with certain outcomes as a special case.
Strauss (1979) and Robertson and Strauss (1981) have examined the relationship
between the Luce model and the corresponding random utility model when the utilities are
allowed to be dependent. As a point of departure we shall adopt their approach to obtain a
characterization of the random utility representation for choice with sure outcomes.
Assumption A5 
The distribution of maxkUk
 is independent of which utility attains the maximum.
Assumption A5' 
Apart from a scale shift, then maxk Uk has the same c.d.f. as Ui , for any i.
16
Theorem 5 
Suppose U	 =1,2,...,N, where fi i >0 are positive constants and the c.d.f. of
17 112, ,11N) is independent of f3 p 2 ,..., 3 N. Then A2 and AS imply that
P(r)(U--Y)) -=
	
N 
\ Y I
for y.>0, where a>0 is a constant and (pH is a function such that (5.1) is a proper c.d.f.
Theorem 5' 
Under the assumptions of Theorem 5, A2 and AS' imply (5.1).
The proofs of Theorem 5 and 5' are given in Robertson and Strauss (1981).
In the case where
	= NV.) = OA)
	 (5.2)
where xv is an increasing function from R 	 R 	c.d.f. of f.J follows from (5.1) by
replacing yi
 by v-1(y). In the case with sure outcomes U is of course equivalent to U. This
is, however, not so when the outcomes are uncertain. From (5.1) it follows that 
(
Er [ri (B s)
(3'sr    
P(
13
n(inaxerYs)) (I)s re,   
(5.3)        
J) 
Def.=
(5.4)
= (E, E3,c.(Ir(13 s))
v- (max
reB,
which means that
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v*(x) = for 0>0,
log x	 for 0 = 0 .
-1 (5.8)
max O r =	 S r 13°.`Ir(Bal.
rElk
From (5.3) and (5.4) it follows that the c.d.f. of (T1 1 ,1 2,...) equals
PInOi s 5_ys))
 = 9(Es
 y:').k
Analogous to the treatment above we define the value function by
Vs(v, = E (max O r I {ri s},9
rE13,
which the agent is supposed to maximize to find the best strategy.
Assumption A6 
The distribution of max,Vs(v,a) is independent of which variable attains the maximum.
Evidently, A5 is a special case of A6.
Let 43 be a non-negative constant and defme
(5.5)
(5.6)
•
(5.7)
The function lif* is increasing and continuous. It is strictly convex for 13>1 and strictly
concave when 0<1.
Theorem 6 
Assume Al and A3. Assume furthermore that (Vs(v,a)) satisfies A6 and that the
corresponding choice probabilities (for choice of strategy) satisfy A2. Then v=i v*.
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PimaxVs (*,a) = maxV,W,a)
i seS, 	 seS2
E[Ei(Er riosr 0)
SES, (5.10)
E [41: 1 :.)`/r(Bsra
se s2
The proof of Theorem 6 is given in the appendix.3
Remark 
From the proof of Theorem 6 it will be realized that 9 also can be negative. However,
there is no loss of generality in restricting O to be non-negative since it can easily be veryfied
that the corresponding choice probabilities depend on O solely through 101.
When w=v* the value function takes the form
(w*, a
(swa E((Er [37 mi3 sr
Logi s + ...LE(log(E [31,(3 s)
a	 a
for	 0,	 (5.9)
0.) for 0 = 0 .
Theorem 7 
Under the assumptions of Theorem 6 and with Si c S2 c S the choice probabilities
are given by
when 03>0, and
Similarly to Theorem 5' it is readily realized that the result of Theorem 6 holds when A6 is replaced by a
suitably modified version of A5'.
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P max V s(ir,a) =maxi/ s (xtr,
sEs
'
	 Es2
(
E exp E(log(E.  I r(B s))) I SI
	= 
sEs
' 	i 	 J\ '
I Z exp(E(log(E. P.' I r(B s)))1S2
	se ,	 i	 J
(5.11)
when 0=0.
Proof:
Consider (5.9) with 03>0 and let
m= log[E(s	 0 fl (rq,(13 s))Ola 10d, (5.12)
and observe that the joint c.d.f. of (tom, logrb,...) equals
From Strauss (1979), pp. 42-43 (eqs. (3.9) and (3.14)) we get that
(5.13)     
P (max V s(v*,a) = max Vs(V,a)1 = P imax (log s + ms) = max (logi s + m
seS, 	 se S2 	 seS, 	 SE S2
=y
sEs, 
e 
m
.  
E e m.
SE S2          
which equals (5.10). The proof of (5.11) is completely analogous.
Q.E.D.
Note that while (5.10) and (5.11) satisfy A2 they do not satisfy A4.
Next we shall demonstrate that the choice model above contains the deterministic
utility model as a special case.
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Corollary 3 
When	 the model given by (5.10) and (5.11) reduces to a deterministic model
where the choice of strategy is determined by maximizing the deterministic utility function
Vs(ir,..) E(maxr(Ir(Bs)vIß r))
	 5.14)
The proof of Corollary 3 is given in the appendix.
When the sets {B s } contain at most one alternative we immediately get the next result.
Corollary 4 
When every set in 8 contains at most one alternative (5.10) reduces to
P(maxV(V,a) =max v(*  a)
SES, 	seS,
g r(s)re
SES,
(Er er gr(s))°ie'
seS,
(5.15)
for Ø>0, and (5.11) reduces to
exp(a	 gr(s) log [3 r)
P(maxVs(eça) •=maxVs Nr, a seS,
wen 0=0, where S1 c S2 c
Observe that for a=0=1, (5.15) coincides with the result of Theorem 3.
The next result extends the result of Corollary 2.
SES, seS, Eexp(ocEr gr(s) log p r)
seS,
(5.16)
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Theorem 8 
Let 8 consist of m+1 strategies where
P(-1-(13 m+1) =i = 	 Ki(Bs) =Tin
 s=1
(5.17)
and ì• € 10,11N• Under the assumptions of Theorem 7
m \um
IHP < P 
m
< maxP 
sS 	 — 	 #1 —
s=1	 sn
when 0>0, and
m vim
I1P
s
when 0=0, where
PS P(Vs(w*,a) =maxV(itr, a)).
(s=1
(5.18)
(5.19)
The proof of Theorem 8 is given in the appendix.
The observable properties (5.18) and (5.19) enable us to carry out non-parametric tests
of the model given in Theorem 7. Unfortunately, empirical testing of (5.18) and (5.19)
requires observations from a homogeneous sample (or alternatively many replications for each
agent). In contrast, when €1,-a=1 the result of Corollary 2 implies that the prediction of the
fraction of time strategy m+1 is chosen is independent of the preference parameters and the
probabilities, {g i(s)}.
Corollary 5 
Under the assumptions of Theorem 8 it follows that
Pm+] <
1 (5.20)
m4-1
when a>13, and
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P >
m#1 
1 (5.21)
m +1
when a<0.
Proof:
From (5.10) it follows that for 13>0
m+,
E = m+1, (5.22)
or equivalently    
Em psek,
M s= 1
Pm+i•
(5.23)   
Since the left hand side of (5.23) is increasing as a function of a/13, it follows that a/O>1
implies
1 mP > _E Pm+i	 s =
s=1 m+ I)
(5.24)
which proves (5.20) when 0>0. Consider next the case with 0.0. By Jensen's inequality and
(5.19) we get 
N
E Ps/m
S 1	 j
[1 -P
m+1
= logiog pm+ , = _E log Ps > log
m
and therefore (5.20) holds when 0=0. The second statement, (5.21), follows similarly.
Q.E.D.
Becker et al. (1963a) state a similar result as in Corollary 5.
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6. Uncertainty versus aggregation of latent alternatives
Consider now an alternative choice setting. The agent now is perfectly certain about
the choice sets. Each choice set B s
 consists of disjoint subsets C., i.e., B s=ugrs. The number
of alternatives in C. is mr(s) and to the observing analyst it is assumed to be an unobservable
that may vary across experiments. Thus we assume that mr(s) is a random variable with
Emr(s) = mqr(s)	 (6.1)
where
m = E E mrco	 (6.2)
j	 r
is assumed to be a constant integer. The analyst knows {q(s)}. Recall that the agent knows
{ mr(s)}. The utility of alternative iE
 C is assumed to be PrEri where Or is a positive constant
that is independent of i and feid are i.i.d. random variables with c.d.f. as in (4.3). The
alternatives in viCri
 can therefore be interpreted as almost "similar" in the sense that their
utilities have the same distribution. The corresponding choice probabilities,
(S;S) P (max (max (13 r Eri) max (max r Er)))
r	 jeS,r
are given by
N
E r mr(5)
;S) 	
Prinro)
jeS r=1
When m is large we have that
(6.3)
(6.4)
P(s;S (6.5)
Recall that from the viewpoint of the analyst, q(s) is the probability that C. is non-empty,
i.e., that an alternative of "type" r is feasible. Suppose next that the agent also does not know
mr(s)} but knows {c (s) } . Then the choice setting is completely analogous to the one treated
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previously with g(s)=ci(s), and by Theorem 2 we get that the first stage choice probabilities
have the same structure as in (6.5). We can therefore conclude that in the choice setting
discussed above and under the hypothesis of rational expectations the choice probabilities do
not depend on whether the agent is uncertain or prefectly certain about his choice set.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the implications from HA combined with different
types of invariance assumptions in the context of a probabilistic formulation of discrete choice
models with uncertain outcomes. These invariance assumptions (A4 to A6) concern properties
of the choice models under aggregation of alternatives, or strategies. We have demonstrated
that the functional forms of the corresponding choice models are simple, and consequently
are convenient for empirical analyses. Moreover, we have derived non-parametrically
observable properties. The invariance assumptions imply that the stochastic versions of
expected utility must have distributions that are equivalent to type I or type III extreme value
distributions. In the special case where the choice outcomes are single alternatives, the choice
probabilities are expressed as a power — or exponential transform — of the expected utility
given the favorable strategy to the sum over the possible strategies of the power — or
exponential transformed — expected utilities given the respective strategies.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2:
From (3.4) and A4 we get:
f(S,EsEs x(s)) = EsEs f({ s),x(s))
	 (A.1)
for x(s) E [O, U N, Sc-§. Also it follows that for any s, f({ s },0)=0, because the probability of
choosing a strategy which almost surely implies an empty choice set is zero. Hence with
x(s')=0, x(s)=x, for all s'7ts, (A.1) reduces to
f(S,x) = f({s } ,x)	 (A.2)
for any SE ScS, and XE [0,1 ]N • But then f({s},-) must be independent of s which by (A.1)
implies
x(s)) = Es. 
S
 60)).
seS 
(A.3)
In Aczél (1966) functional equations of the type (A.3) are treated. There it is demonstrated
that (A.3) implies that f() is linear, say
N
f(x) = f3 ix E D k Xk
k=1
(A.4)
where 13k>0, k=1,2,...,N, are scalars. Now (3.7) follows from (3.3) and (A.4).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Note first that since the sets {B,} by Al are disjoint it follows that Ui, iE B, are
independent of V, for r*s. It therefore remains to prove that Ui, iE B, are independent of V,.
Since
V 
s ds = max Uk '	 (A.5)
keB s
where
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E 0.0,(13
d = 	k	 s 
Ek P k gk(S)
we have
P(U ; = max Uk , Vs 5_ = P(U. = max Uk , max Uk y ds)
ka 	 as 	 g	 kas
yds
=( > max Uk , U i y d s) = f > max Uk1 
1 
E dX) = f exp	
ka
-x E 0,10. -2 dx
	. 	 -kE}3.-{i} 	 / 	 0 	 kEBg-{i} 	 0
(A.6)
(A.7)
pi 
- exp(--(yd s) l EkeB. f3 k) =	 B Nmax Uk yd s) 	 B (NT s
ka s
EkeB. 13 k
This completes the proof.
The following lemma is useful for proving Theorem 6.
Lemma 1 
Q.E.D.
Let h,v,w, and f be real-valued functions defined on an open interval Kci?, having one
as a limit point, with h and w strictly monotonic (or nonconstant, continuous); suppose that
h(xy) = v(x) + f(x)w(y)	 (A.8)
whenever x, y, xy E K.
Then either f is a constant function and there are constants ao, ai, a2 and a3, with ao,
a3, >0, such that for all XE K
h(x) = ao logx + al + a2 ,
v(x) = ao logx + a2 ,
w(x) = (ao /a3)logx + al /a3 ,	 (A.9)
f(x) = a3 ,
or f takes at least two distinct values and there are constants ao, al, a2, a3, and X with a3>0,
and Xoc0<0 such that for all x E K
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( „
13 	b
(y a 
V-1 (Y2r
P(V 1 5..y 1 ,V2 y2) = (f) (A.12)
h(x) = a0(1 -x 2') + a i a2 ,
v(x) = (ao +a l)(1 -x 2L) a2 ,
w(x) =(ao /a3)(1 -x ?) p, 43 3 ,
f(x) =a3x.
(A.10)
For a proof of Lemma 1 we refer to Falmagne (1985), p.p. 85-89.
Proof of Theorem 6 
Consider the special case with one sure outcome, (1), and one (2) uncertain strategy.
Assume furthermore that B2 contains either alternative 2 or alternative 3. From (5.7) and (5.5)
we obtain
v2 V2(V,a) V(TI	 g2(2) + x61 12/a 3)(1 - g2(2)) ,	 (A.11)
By A6 and Theorem 5 the c.d.f. of (V 1 ,V2) must be of the form
where b depends on g2(2). When y2=0° we get
=
(A.13)
Since the distribution of V 1 does not depend on g2(2) we realize that the function (I) cannot
depend on g2(2). Therefore, it follows from (A.11) and (A.12) that
w(11 12/13 2)g2(2) v(71 121a 13)( -g2(2))
must have the same distribution as
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w(1-1 b)
for all g2(2) E [0,1]. But then for almost all x>0 and z E [0,1 ]
í(x 2) + 	P13)(1 - = V (X b(Z))
	 (A.14)
Without loss of generality assume that 13243. By assumption v is increasing and (A.14)
therefore implies that b is increasing. Let c be the inverse of b, whence
(xy) = v(x 13 3) 4- (w(x E3 2) - V(X E3 3)) C(y) • 	 (A.15)
We are now ready to apply the result of Lemma 1. Let h(x)=v(x), v(x)=V133x), w(x)=c(x),
and f(x)=(42)-v(433). Suppose f is not a constant. From (A.10) we get
and
(A.16)
(A.17)
(A.18)
(A.19)
11(X) = W(X) = a0 (1 -x') + (X 1 + a2 '
v(x) = v(13 4x) = (ao +a 1)(1 -x	 a21
w(x) = c(x) = (a0/a3)(1 -x ) + a 1 /CIC3 '
f(x) = w(x0 2) - (x 3) = a3 X I '
When we combine (A.16), (A.17) and (A.19) we get the additional restrictions
a l = ao (f3 ); -1)
and
a3 = ao (f3 3)‘ - P 21 > O.
Hence
...w(x) ao + a 1 + a2 - ao x	 oc0 ß 3 + a2 aox	 (A.20)-
Without loss of generality we may fix the parameters such that a0=-1 and a2=-aog, and
therefore iv must be a power function. Conversely, when OA it is easily veryfied that
{Vs(v*,a)} satisfies A6 for any set { gk(s)}. Thus the conclusion of the theorem follows
provided f is not a constant. When f is a constant we obtain similarly from (A.9) that
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w(x).logx, and the proof is complete.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 3 
Consider first ws defined by
w s = E((E , P7I,(13 sra 	(A.21)
as	 For simplicity and without loss of generality assume that E>1 for all r. By applying
l'Hôpital's rule we obtain
(A.22)
log(Er [37I,(B s))	 Er 07 (log 13 r) Ip s) 	 Er
 ( 3,43)-00g o r)Ip s)
lim 	  = lim
	  
= lim 	
Œ
	—>e°
	
Er 0.:LI,(3)	 a, — 	 (p/p)ZIp s)
where 13 max43,.. Since 0/0).-->o when ot--300 for all [3r that are less than VI it follows that
the last expression above equals
maxr@ogp„) Ir(B s))
from which follows that
lim	 P ra Ip sra = max,P re I(B s),	 (A.23)
when 9>0. But then, by Lebesgue's Dominated Convergence Theorem we also have
lim w s
 = E((max,13 (r)
 I(B)) 1 4.	 (A.24)
Let w max w s . Then we can express the choice probability of strategy j, given the choice
seS,
set S2, as
30
W OE (Wi/Wr
	J 
	= 	k 
E w: E (w s /w)a
	SES, 	 SE S2
When a--->oo then the choice probabilities for those j for which wj<w tend towards zero while
when wj=w, the corresponding choice probability tends towards one. But this means that in
the limit the agent will select the strategy that maximizes (5.14) with probability one. The
case when V(x)=logx is proved similarly.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 8 
Let
m+i
= E
s=i
P
s
	 (A.25)
(A.26)
From (5.10) it follows that
= m + 1.
a
Provided Ps # Pm+1 for at least one s the function II is strictly convex. Note also that
11(0)=m+1. Thus when p'(0)<0 the equation p(x)=m+1 has one and only one positive solution
while when te(0).?.0 it has no positive solution. Hence for (A.26) to have a positive solution
for Wa we must have
= E logPs -  ' m+1
s.i
(A.27)
When Ps=P, for all s..rn then IZ(0)=0 and (A.26) holds for all positive Wa. Thus the left
hand side of (5.18) has been proved.
Note that (A.26) is equivalent to
I 	'eie
, mE
m s.,■
=Pm+i•
(A.28)
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Obviously
_E pela
m s=1
(
m
< _E max P s°/a
s.--1	 sSm
max Ps 	= max P ,
s< rn 	
ssm
(A.29)
which proves the right hand side of (5.18).
Q.E.D.
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